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When asked if an Indian object he had obtained was smuggled, the
late Norton Simon was repOlted to have said: "Hell, yes it was smuggled. T
pent between $15 and $16 million over the last year on Asian Art, and
most of it was muggled (as quoted in Burnham, 1975, p. 168).

Introduction
We intend addressing three issues in till paper. First we will
describe in detail not available elsewhere the patterns that are fo\md in the
illicit traffic in antiquities that flow out of Southeast Asia in particular
from Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar Thailand and Vietnam. Second,
we shall examine the fonus of organized crime that have emerged in order
to SUppOlt that traffic. Third, we will propose initiatives that are both
focused on the demand end of the market chain (rather than on the supply
end), and on tho e approaches than give empha is to persuasion' rather
tban punishment and prohibition.

Limitations
We should begin by recognizing that study of the illicit traffic in
cultural heritage material, especially in Asia, is at a much earlier, and
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televisio~ sources, act~ally entice major market players (including
Sotheb~ s) to engage. In a range of illegal behaviour involving the
smugglmg an~ preparatIOn of false export/import documents of proscribed
cultural matenal (for an all too brief discussion by a criminologist who
actuall~ ~e.nt "undercover" and worked with police in the investigation of
the antIqUItIes trade, see Wilson, 2000).
Finally, it also must be pointed out that there are situations where
close investiga!ion of this illicit traffic could become exceedingly
dangerous. As IS .true ~f many forms of illicit traffic, there is much money
to be made, espeCIally In the source nations. Those making that money are
oft~n well connected to police or military authorities, and take a dim view
of Interference in their lucrative activities.

therefore cruder, level of development than studies of such illicit markets as
those involving drugs or the trade in women. This is not because the traffic
itself is new. In fact, one could easily argue that the plunder of antiquities
pre-dates such problems as the current issues with illicit drugs since it
extends back through the centUlies. The tombs of the Egyptian pharaohs
were often plundered almost as soon as they had been sealed. In China, a
catalog of what were even by then ancient bronzes appeared as early as
1092, and a similar catalog of the antiquities collection of the Song court
was published in 1123 (Debaine-FrancfoIi 1999,15). No grand tour was
complete without the learned gentleman returning home with various
plundered trinkets to demonstrate his intimate acquaintance with Greek and
Roman culture. In short the antiquities traffic is much older than the more
recent problems of the traffic in alcohol in the United States in the early
20 111 century, and the on-going drug wars that have their origins in
developments.in the mid to late 20 111 century.
What is remarkable is that the commentary on the plunder of
cuJtmal heritage has been so slow to evolve, and that there has been almost
no major research grant money devoted to its study. Our work, for example,
has been done almost exclusively out of our own resources. This is a major
issue when it is recognized that the traffic itself is truly multi-national and
transnational in scope. There are many different countries that yield up,
however unwillingly, cultural material for the market. The chains involved
from initial plunder to ultimate sale are lengthy and extend potentially
across many national bowldaries. Those involved represent many different
languages and cultural backgrounds, languages and backgrounds that these
investigators do not speak and are ignorant of.
Further, we are not helped in any way by the existing criminal
justice system in terms of knowledge or even data. Virtually all art crime,
including cultural heritage crime, belongs to the well known "dark figure"
of crime, that is, it resides outside of the reach of current crime statistics.
While there have been some who have struggled to find some information
from sources such as customs records, in fact we have no solid evidence of
the size of the traffic in plundered antiquities (despite rather extravagant
claims about the volume of that this traffic). In addition, as university
researchers, there are constraints imposed upon us by "human ethics"
procedures that limit approaches that can be taken to study illicit traffic
patterns. InvestigativejournaLists such as Peter Watson (1998), despite his
connection with ambridge University, have much greater freedom to ask
questions that we as university researchers are not permitted to ask (for
example, of antiquities dealers who obviously are selling plundered
objects). In Watson's case he could, as a journalist with funding from

. O~ work, and that of others suggests tbat Bangkok is a major
transIt pomt for cultural heritage material flOWing ut of Cambodia
Myanmar, aos ,and Thailan? although it seems also to be a secondary
portal for matenal from China. The actual chain of movement can be
complex, and d~pen~s. upon such factors as the nature of the objects being
transpo~ed, theIr .ongm, an.d. their destination. Consider, for an example,
CambodIan matenal that ongmates in the Khmer sites of Cambodia most
of which transits through Bangkok. Many of the Khmer objects ar~ large
stone statutes, whose bulk and weight pose major problems in tenus of the
trans-shipment. Our field work suggests that much of the transport is
accomplIshed by road with trucks crossing the border into Thailand with
an intermediate destination of Bangkok from where they are ship;ed to
market centres around the world (see also Beech, 2003, p. 56). There also
ha~e been other reports of. crated material weighing several tons being
shIpped from the CambodIan port of Sihounoukville by freighter via
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Illicit antiquities traffic in southeast Asia

"

Th~ focus of this paper is on the illicit traffic in antiquities that

ongI~ates In the south and east of Asia (two important sources ~f material

on thIS traffic are the excellent books by Murphy, 1995, and by Mackenzie,
2005). We have located our investigations on the gateway portals of
Bangkok, and Hong Kong, with some attention paid to Singapore and
Macau as well.

Bangkok as a Portal

Singapore, and from there onward to Bangkok (Doole, 1999, 7; see also
Thosarat, 1999, 107). Even smaller objects from Cambodia, such as ancient
beads, apparently make their way to markets in Bangkok (Thosarat, 2001;
O'Reilly, 2005).
There is less finn documentation of the patterns of movement of
material from Myanmar and Laos, although Bangkok appears to serve as
the major market portal. There certainly over recent years has been a large
amount of material from these two countries on offer in the antiquities
shops in Bangkok, and at least one infonnant in an interview suggested that
a major source of income for the "generals" in Myanmar was derived from
cultural heritage material shipped by truck to the border with Thailand.
Naturally enough, the venues around Bangkok also offer a range of
material from various parts, and archaeological periods, of Thailand (many
important Khmer sites, for example, are found in Thailand, see Freeman,
1996). Bangkok also seems to serve as a secondary source of material from
China, since there can be found there a number of shops offering what
appear to be high quality, expensive Chinese objects.
One factor which contributes to the role played in the region by
Bangkok is that the criminal sanctions on export apply only to materials
originating in Thailand, so that trade in objects that originate from
Cambodia, China, Laos and Myanmar are not covered by the legislation
(Mackenzie, 2005, 66). Raids on museums made in Los Angeles in early
2008 by authorities investigating illegal smuggling of material which had
originated in Bangkok identified objects from China and Myanmar as well
as Thailand (Setjeant, 2008).

Hong Kong and Macau as Portals

Mongolia, Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces, among many others (Shuzhong,
1999; 88~91). The trail of antiquities is complicated, since a large amount
of matenal fl.ows to a huge domestic market in the major metropolitan
centres of China. From these centres, the evidence indicates that a major
route of some of the material is outward through the duty free ports of
Hong Kong and Macau. As Murphy notes, Hong Kong is:
.
." ~n ~d.eal conduit because of its proximity, its local expertise in
Chine~e antIqmtIes and large number of dealers and buyers, its position as a
finanCIal and transportation centre, and its relatively open border (Murphy
1995,58).
'
Similarly, Shuzhong (1999,92) states simply that Hong Kong is the
". " most important staging post for the illicit traffic" out of China. There
also appear~ to be, from. ou~ observations, a secondary traffic from Hong
Ko~g to Smg~pore, TaIpeI and Bangkok, since large venues offering
Chmese matenal can be found in those locations.' Murphy and other
observers have pointed out that there are risks involved in this trade of
material from China, since there are some customs seizures of material
occasional arrests of those involved, and for the tomb robbers in China th~
penalties can include capital punishment
Mackenzie (2005, 140) has argued that one issue that makes transit
points like Hong Kong important in the market chain is that while
extraction of the material is in violation of source nation laws and
regulations, in most market nations (such as the United States, England and
France) the sale of antiquities is open and legal. It is the passage of goods
through portals such as Hong Kong that provides the illicit objects with
w?at he tenns a "mask of legitimacy" since they will be transported onward
WIth what appear to be legitimate export/import documents (their status as
stol~n objects, Mackenzie is careful to point out, does not change despite
havmg such documentation).

China provides a major source of cultural heritage material in the
Asian region. Given its rich and long history, sites are to be found
throughout the country. It should be noted that plundering also has a long
history in China, with written evidence of the problem extending
backwards at least to the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD, see discussion of
Murphy, 1995, 52-53), and also there are iconographic sources such as the
painting of two gentlemen "Enjoying Antiquities" (presumably plundered)
painted by the Ming Dynasty artist Tu Chin (active ca. 1465-ca. 1509)
which is in the collection of the National Palace Museum in Taipei (Hearn,
1997,98). The size of the country is huge, and the patterns of movement of
plundered material complex. Commentators of identified numerous sources
of illicit material, including sites in Hebei, Xingjiang, Hubei, lrmer

While it does not appear to be a major player (partly because of its
own limite.d domestic market), Singapore as a duty free port seems to play
some role m the flow of cultural heritage material in this region. Evidence
of others, as noted earlier, has documented the movement of material from
Cambodia into Bangkok via Singapore. The various antiquities venues in
Orchard Road and the Tanglin Shopping Complex offer a range of quality

122

/23

Singapore as a Portal

antiquities from China, Tibet, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos, among
others, and there appear to be links between establishments in Singapore
and both Hong Kong and Bangkok. In comparison to Bangkok at least, an
advantage of Singapore is that once the material has been shipped into that
port, few problems are presented in the export of material.

Other Asian sites

While our attention has been directed primarily at material flowing
through the major Asian portals such as Bangkok, Hong Kong Macau and
Singapore other regions merit attention. Vietnam was the centre of Cham
culture (which for much of its existence was at war with the Khmers in
what is now Cambodia, and then with the Vietnamese) but most of the
important material from that culture was plundered either when the country
was under French control, or during the Vietnam wars (see Guillon, 2001).
Indonesia has in the past had a rich cultural heritage, including important
sites showing Hindu influence that are from a petiod slightly earlier than
similar developments in Thailand and Cambodia. Much of the material was
plundered long ago, although we observed in recent years an exhibition
(and attempts to sell) a large selection of stone objects (much like the
Khmer material) on sale. with limited provenance, in Singapore. Korea had
a large amount of cultural objects removed during the colonial occupation
by Japan from 1910 to 1945, and a second wave ofloss occurred during the
Korean War from 1950 to 1953. As a consequence, as one observer notes
" ... Korean cultural objects are very rare" (Kim, 2001, 5), but there is
apparently a small traffic in the few objects that are available, and the loss
of any of these is important since there is little left of such cultural heritage
material in its original and true cultural context. For somewhat different
reasons, Japan similarly seems to see a relatively small traffic out of the
country of unique cultural beritage material in part because that culture
prizes to a very high degree is cultural heritage, and has long been known
for its willingness to protect its history. On the other hand, Japan
occasionally becomes involved as a destination for other nation's cultural
material, as in the case involving the Miho Museum in Kyoto which found
it had purchased a rare Buddhist statute which had been stolen from China,
which the Museum then returned (an interesting development because at
the time Japan had not signed the various UNESCO and Unidroit
conventions so there was no legal obligation to take this step) (Doole, 2001,
15).
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Features ofthe illicit traffic in antiquities

O~r pre~io~s. research (see, for example, Alder and Polk, 2005) into
the traffic III antIqUltIes suggests that there are many similarities with other
forms of illicit markets. (see also Mackenzie, 2005) Like most of these
oth~r ~.arkets (for a description, see Chawla and Pietschmann, 2005), the
antIquItIes traffic has a strong international component. The demand from
purchasers is the basic economic force which drives the market (and the
cooseque~t destru~tion of sites), and a significant component of that
demand IS found III such market centres as London, New York, Pari ,
Brt.Issels or.Amsterdam, among others. Particularly but not uniquely, in
ASIa there IS a well as strong domestic and regional demand for these
?bjects which, as we shall see, complicates how we look at the control
Issue.
Given the international reach, the trade must contend with the
~roblem that the x:novement of material out of the country of origin is
Illegal. In tum, this tends to generate two problems common to illegal
~rkets. One, smuggli?g operations are required given that export is
illegal, and these often Illvolve complexities imposed by the nature of the
goods being transported. In the case of some of the Cambodian and Chinese
s~one object.s which often are quite large and exceptionally heavy, both the
SIZe an~ weIght issues complicate the movement proces . Huge crates and
~e equipmen,t ne~essary to move them are expensive, and not easily either
hIdden or disgtllsed. Two, if there is to be consistent and repeated
movement of material across national boundaties, assurance of the success
of the endeavors can be improved through the corruption of public officials.
Both of these problems are addressed through the natural development of
fonns of organized social activity that we are likely to term "organized
crime'. There certainly is evidence in telIDS of the movement of these
large objects through China, Cambodia and Thailand of some level of
corrupt organization that resembles what is seen elsewhere in terms of
organized crime.
Complicating all of this is the problem common to illicit markets is
the fact that there are actually many different kinds of objects, and markets
rat~er . t.han just one "antiquities market" (this is true throughout the
antIqUl~te~ markets). One of our earliest informants, for example, was a
dealer.IllJade objects from China. These items are actually quite small, and
a rel~tIvely large "~olume" of material can be carried easily on the person.
In this case, there IS no need for the complication of an "organization" to
assure a constant supply of material since a dealer can obtain a reasonable
supply of material on a single trip, carrying a large inventory on the person.
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Similarly, we have fOWld that dealers in Chinese ceramic material indicate
that their yearly needs for material do not involve large volumes, so that a
little as one container a year might be sufficient to satisfy the needs of a
moderate sized antiquities shop. In short while some form of social
organization" might be necessary to assure a sustained and vital market of
any particular form of cultural heritage material those needs may not
require the full range of organizations that might be implied in the term
"organized crime '.
There are some differences, however, between the traffic in
antiquities and other major illicit markets. One of the most important is that
while the movement of material from source may be illegal, the sale of
cultural heritage objects in the major market centres is open and legal. We
have found Khmer objects from Cambodia, and various forms of ceramic
and stone material from China on ale in venues in London, New York,
Paris Amsterdam and many other western locations, objects whose absence
of provenance suggest illicit origins. In fact, it is not uncommon for the
dealers when approached by naIve potential customers to have various
devices or stories which are used to convince them that the objects are
plundered and illegally smuggled, in order to counter the possibility that the
objects in question are fakes. While doing field work out of Phimai in
Thailand we were taken by archaeologists to a burial site in a remote
province which had been plundered. Some months later, in visiting a hop
specializing in Thai objects in Singapore, we saw a photograph taped to a
display case that bore a remarkable resemblance to the site we had seen.
The pictme was taken to show the "dig in process (which was in fact a
photo of the plunderers at work). The objects on offer were eli tinctive
bronze age ceramics of the exact size and type we had seen at the ite.
Once again, what the shop owners were doing is presenting evidence of
pltmder as a way of assuring the "authenticity of their merchandise, since
faking is an endemic problem throughout the industry.

Forces influencing changes in the marketfor south east Asian antiquities

slowing in the demand for antiquities from the region. It can be presumed
that the current eco~omic. cri.sis will have a similar effect, although it may
be much greater SInce It Involves a world-wide economic recession.
Poli~ical developments play their role, as we find in the changing in the
relatIOns between Cambodia and Thailand. Since much of the Khmer
materi~l. pass~s through Bangkok as its main gateway, if the Thai
~uthonttes. deCIde the take a stronger stand against that traffic, as they did
In th~ penod 5 to 6 years ago, there is a slowing in the movement of
matenal, .at least through the major venues such as the River City shopping
complex III Bangkok. Currently there is a high level of tension between the
two countries, however, and it should come as no surprise that it seems to
us that ~uch more Cambodian material is on public display in Bangkok.
Equally Important are the steps taken by the individual governments against
the traffic, and these seem to rise and wane with the movement of different
individuals in key political positions. Recently we have noticed a marked
increase in the flow onto the market of material from Tibet, and this
probably can be traced to the strained relations between the central Chinese
g~vernment and the culture of resistance that still exists among native
TIbetans. Fads in the market also playa role, since events such as the
Chinese Warriors exhibitions a few years ago tend to result in an increased
demand for Chinese objects, with that demand falling off as the fad fades.
Changing technologies playa role as well, as seen in the role in the market
now played by such inte~et based sources as eBay (one of the places
where the presence of TIbetan material is so obvious in the middle of
2008). Finally, theoretically at least one might presume that developments
in the criminal justice system would play a role, since it is reasonable to
assume that major players in the antiquities markets will be aware of such
events as the conviction and three year sentence handed out to a wellknown New York dealer (for a commentary on the Schultz case see
Gerstenblith, 2008. pp. 70-74), or the dramatic arrest and then death i~jail
in Seattle of a well known Bangkok dealer (Felch, 2008). The conclusion of
all of this is that these markets have to be viewed as dynamic, and in a
constant process of change and development, an observation which can
complicate enormously our attempts to bring this traffic under some
amount of control.

In the years Ulat we have been observing the movement of cultural
heritage material, we have begun to see that significant changes take place
over time in the forms of illicit traffic. There are a number of factors that
seem to be shaping this market. Economic development play an important
role, since the demand for antiquities in th market centres depends to some
degree upon the health of the economy. When the Asian economies went
through a major downturn a few years ago there eemed to be a marked

. .. Any ~omplex criminal activity that involves a long chain of
IndIVIduals lInked internationally from initial plunders in supply
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Illicit antiquities and organized crime

environments, to agents, to buyers, to smugglers, and then to antiquities
dealers in market states will require some degree of "organization."
Whether that fits into traditional conceptions of organized crime is another
matter. A number of issues seem important in shaping this discussion.
First, there is no doubt that the type of activity we have described does in
many cases match the requirements of the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (UNODC, 2004. see also Bowman, 2008)
to be considered as being carried out by an 'organized criminal group,'
namely:
... a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period
of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more
serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention,
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit
(Article 2).

Some observers have pointed out that physical items such as art and
antiquities can provide objects that might prove useful as a way of
:'l~~deri.n~': the w~alth in cash obtained from the drug traffic or other
IllICIt actIVItIes. While authorities worldwide have sought to curb the flow
of 'bl~ck mo~ey' by tightening regulations regarding banking and allied
finanCIal bodIes the use of such objects for money laundering has grown.
As Fidler (2003) has noted:
. Ferrying cash across borders is difficult, and carrying diamonds or
bulhon creates suspicion. Moving works of art or antiquities is much easier.
Even big works can be moved; ancient friezes, for example, can be
exported as Italian tiles. For money launderers, antiquities [also] have an
advantage over prominent painting ; it is often impossible to determine if
they are stolen (Fidler, 2003, 1).
. The lack of any documentation regarding the provenance or
provemence of a particular antiquity is an issue we discuss in more detail
below. But in general, unless an object has been taken from an established
site or museum it is unlikely to have any verifiable identification which
would reveal to a suspicious border control or customs official whether it
came from a legitimate or illegitimate source. Further, most of these
officials at the exporting and importing level are unlikely to have an
exp.ert~se in arc~e~logy or cultural studies which might prompt their
cunosity or SuspIcIOn about the origins of an object. Thus the risk of
d~te.ction for any money laundering or other related offence is usually at a
rrummum.

Despite this match, unlike many other forms of illicit traffic
covered by the Convention, the efforts of an established criminal enterprise
is not required to keep the activities flourishing but hidden since the sale of
antiquities in most market locations is legal. Most of our images of
organized crime, as in the media stereotypes found in movies or TV,
feature the "mob" working in the destination market. Emphatically, the
"Sopranos" are not part of the sale of elegant Chinese antiquities in the high
end venues in London, Paris or New York.
Second, as we have already indicated, much of the traffic in
antiquities is of a relatively low volume (since many of the objects are
small, and not a great number are needed for a reasonable profit to be
made), and does not require a large infrastructure for the support of
equipment, personnel and subterfuge. Some overlap might still be expected
when the need for organization in antiquities occurs in geographic
proximity as it does in the Middle East with opiates (and a long history of
classical antiquities), Latin America with cocaine (and Pre-Columbian
objects), or perhaps sections close to the "Golden Triangle" in Asia (with
proximity to at least some cultural heritage sites). And, indeed, one does
pick up some anecdotes of such overlap. In a television program some
years ago there was a short clip of a van stopped at a customs check point
somewhere in the Middle East, and agents were in the process of removing
a cache of both drugs and small antiquities. One of our informants in
Bangkok alleged that the military authorities in Myanmar routinely sent
trucks down to the border with Thailand, loaded, it was said, with "girls,
drugs and antiquities".

This is not to say that there is no "organized crime" involved in the
antiquities traffic. The movement of large, bulky and heavy items involves
a number of complications, and steps. Extraction of the material may
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The broad conclusion that we have come to as a result of our field

wo~k i~ that there is little evidence coming through at the present time of
major mvolvement of traditional elements of organized crime in the illicit
trade in antiquities within the geographical region of interest. In fact, as we
have ~ug?ested, there is for much of the trade scarce need for complex
orgamzatlOn because of the nature of the objects being dealt with (some
small,. an~ others of t.U0derate size and volume of trade). Large criminal
orgamzatlOns are qmte expensive to maintain and require reasonable
volumes to justify the expense. This is consistent with the observations of
Mackenzie (2005), who found that for most dealers the transport problem
was mundane, commenting that while drugs such as heroin are not usually
trafficked by FedEx, " ... this was the method of shipment recommended to
me by an antiquity dealer I spoke to on Hollywood Road" (Mackenzie
2005, 137).
'

require manpower and expertise at removal (especially in terms of large
stone objects). Payment has to be arranged for the extraction by agents who
then must work through the transit problems. The objects have to be lifted
and carried from site of origin to some transit point (for example, being
lifted by a crane so that they can be carried by truck to a point where they
are placed in a container for shipment by sea). Papers have to be arranged
which permit some form of access to both export and import procedures.
Dealers who are complicitous in this process must then be found so that the
items can be placed on wholesale and ultimately retail markets in
destination countries. In turn, buyers must be found who are willing to
purchase cultural heritage material without asking questions about
provenance.
The criminal organization for antiquities in these circumstances at
the source end likely will be surreptitious and involve individuals who
know they are taking risks but for whom the financial rewards are great
enough justify taking those risks. In the less developed regions of Asia,
there is not a large range of sources that can provide the transport
infrastructure that will be required for the large objects in terms of cranes,
trucks, containers and ships. It is not surprising that the military often
appears in accounts of traffic at this end of the market (eg, regarding the
involvement of Cambodian military authorities in the traffic of Khmer
objects, see Beech, 2003, 56; and Thosarat, 1999, 69 comments on a
"General" who was making " ... a very lucrative profit off the sales of
artefacts ... "), as do police (Doole, 1999, 7). Mackenzie (2005, 19)
describes a situation where the looting of a Cambodian temple site involved
several hundred soldiers and heavy machinery, with the objects reportedly
being stolen to order by the army in response to a request by a Thai
antiquities dealer operating out of Bangkok. One of Mackenzie's (2005,
141) informants pointed out the obvious fact that in China, ' ... the army
has the lorries with which they can transport the objects".
There is, thereby, some amount of organization to the illicit traffic
in antiquities. Watson and Todeschini state in their analysis of looting in
Italy that the illegal" ... trade in antiquities is organized" (Watson and
Todeschini, 2007, 340, emphasis in original). A key element in their
analysis was the way the networks ("cordate" in Italian) are crucial to the
successful accomplishment of the sale of plundered goods. While these
might not correspond to stereotypic notions of drug-centered organized
crime, in fact, emerging criminological conceptions of organized criminal
workings are widening to incorporate such activity. Edwards and Levi
(2008) argue that one of the major ways criminologists today look at the
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phenomenon of organized crime is focused precisely upon the notion of
"networks", this approach serving:
As a way of des.cribing the structure and/or everyday workings of
the market a.s a whole, ill the sense that the market can be regarded as a
complex soclal netw rk (singular noun) within which different participants
have to network (verb) (to carefully seek out and interact with traffickers
who may be like or unlike themselves, etc....In other word through
networking, traffickers [and other offenders] construct th~ market
(Edwards and Levi, 2008 364, emphasis in original).
Put in other word the evolving conceptions of organized crime
a~pear to be widening (for another example, see oles, 2001), and the
kinds of pr cesses involved in the traffic in antiquities contain such
elem~nts as. networking, smuggling, and political conuption that are
conSistent "':lth at lea t SOme of these theoretical perspectives.
Dunng OUf research he enior law enforcement officials within the
region with whom we discussed the possible links between organized crime
~ou~ and the antiquities trade tended to share our general view of the
sltuatlo? Many admitted to a lack of knowledge at large about the
~afficking of cultural objects, seeing it at best as a minor law enforcement
IS ue and at worst as a possible distraction in the 'war against drugs . Some
acknowledged a particular interest and concern about the money laundering
aspects of the antiquities marketplace.
" One former crime agency head who now pends most of his time
advlslDg governments throughout the region about anti money laundering
m~sures told u recently that he suspected the dark figure of cultural
objects laundered by persons involved in the trafficking of drugs and
humans wa far greater than many believed, and that organised group of
traffi~kers ~ere weil ahead of law enforcement in recognizing the benefits
of tm particular ru e to wash clean the products of other illicit endeavors.
The arne source told us that in his view a significant weakness in the anti
mo~ey laundering arsenal was the ease with which cultural objects from the
regl~n cou~d be trans-shipped around the globe by established air freight
couners WIth few qu~tlOns asked at the point of shipping or receipt
u tlally becau e of the Ignorance of the officials involved about the cultural
ignificance of particular objects, or through conupt practices such as the
use of false documentation.
ill the abse~ce o~ detailed tudies of the antiquities marketplace
throughout the regIOn Vlew like those just expres ed must remain
speculative. Nonet?eless it would be misleading to give the impression that
law enforcement IS a~ a. ~otal standstill when it comes to tackling the
problems of looted allt1qllltles. For xample in Cambodia international law
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enforcement agencies like the FBI have been invited by the Cambodian
Government to advise a new national heritage police force established to
end the systematic pillaging of the country's ancient monuments (De
Launey, 2007). This development was preceded by an agreement between
the US, a nation which has been one of the main recipients of plundered
Khmer art, and Cambodia aimed at stifling the illicit trade in cultural
objects. As part of this agreement the US has placed import restrictions on
ancient stone, metal and ceramic objects from Cambodia (BBC News,
2003).
Thefailure ofpunishment and the needfor persuasion alternatives
Each form of illicit traffic presents its own set of problems in terms
of the harm caused, and how that might be addressed. A major aspect of the
harm in terms of the plunder of cultural heritage material consists of the
loss to human knowledge about our past that results from the destruction of
heritage sites. The need for urgency of action can be found in the words of
Professor Colin Renfrew who has argued that the looting of archaeological
sites is an " ... unmitigated and continuing catastrophe for the world's
archaeological heritage" (Renfrew, 2006, 15). Anything that is done must
be assessed against the hard criterion of whether or not it contributes to a
reduction in this destruction.
The current response has evolved to consist primarily of various
forms of legal prohibition. Most source nations have a created a number of
layers of protection. Many of these began by creating a range of laws which
prohibit the export of material without state approval. When these proved
insufficient, additional laws have been created in the major source states
which define the removal of cultural heritage matelial without approval a a
form of theft, in some cases reinforcing this with heavy penalties (in China,
for example, convicted offenders may be executed). At the international
level, a number of supporting conventions and treaties have been developed
by the UN, including the important UNESCO Convention of 1970 as well
as the Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention of 2001 (this last
convention aims to close down entirely the market, providing that there be
"no commercial exploitation" of underwater material). It needs to be
pointed out, however, that one of the unique aspects of lhe traffic in
antiquities is that the sale of antiquities has not been criminalized in most
market nations (although many have signed one or another of the UN
sponsored conventions), and today antiquities without documentation (and
therefore presumed to be plundered) can be found on open and legal sale in

132

the various sale centres, such as New York, Paris, Amsterdam, Stockholm
and London.
In short, the major response to try to counter the illicit traffic in
antiquities has been the passage of various laws which are aimed at
prohibition of that traffic in the source environments, while the demand has
be~n allowe~ to continue virtually unabated. For criminologists, there are
m~Jor questIOns to be asked about the effectiveness of prohibition as the
pnmaI,Y or sole form of public policy, especially given the record of failure
of major attempts to restrict supply, in the face of continued demand.
:"'here rich demand communities are willing to pour vast sums of money
mto the purc~1ase of the goods, those trapped in lives of squalor and
hopelessne~s m the poor. communities where the cultural heritage sites are
found ~re hkely to be WIlling to consider the risks posed by even the most
dracoman laws. ~ackenzie (20?2) has stated the conclusion as succinctly
as any~~e, obsen,rmg that when It comes to antiquities existing laws appear
to be '" creatmg problems rather than solving them", going on to
comment that:
Ineffective. pro~~itions by. source States combined with complex
and hugely expenSIve CIvIl mechamsms for recovery of looted artifacts, all
amount to a system of legal governance which is demonstrably failing to
stop the plunder (Mackenzie, 2002, 160-161).
From our perspective, it is unfortunate that many in the
archaeological community do not share in these conclusions and in fact
place considerable faith in those policies which are based 'primarily in
prohibition. Writers such as Kersel and Luke (2003) comment that there
have been great advances in the way individual source nations strive to
protect their cultural heritage (for example, by training their own
archaeologi~ts, an~ restricting access of outsiders, including scholars, to
cultural hentage sItes), and instead of seeking other options state their
belief that " .. , protection efforts must continue to focus on i~ternational
and national legal frameworks for cultural property protection" (Kersel and
Luke, 2003, 30).
We agree that a primary goal is the protection of archaeological
context, and if the existing policies were achieving that goal, there might be
more suppo~ ~or. t~ese propositions as a basis for building the major effort
~o control this. IlhcIt traffic. From the perspective of criminology, however,
It has to be SaId that there is no reason to have faith in penal tactics based in
prohibition and deterrence, especially given the particular set of factors that
shape the traffic in antiquities. One of the most important of these is that
the trade in antiquities in market centres continues to be legal, and
vigorous.
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However one might wish it to be otherwise, there is, and will
continue to be, a robu t trade in antiquities. In part this is because there is in
private hands a huge amount of heritage material that can not be prohibited
from being placed on the market. Antiquities have been traded for decades,
even centuries, and any attempt to restrict the access to the market of those
who own this propetty (for example, heritage material with a provenance
extended back before 1970) will n.m afoul of a number of economic and
civil rights issues. Equally important, while from the standpoint of
prohibitionists there might have been some gains (such as the conviction of
Schultz in New York) that may have some effect on the market, in general
there continues to be a huge volume of material on the current market that
clearly comes from cultural heritage sites and is being sold with no
provenance or provenience information whatsoever.
We are not, however, caUing for an abandonment of the existing
prohibitions in the source nations. Rather, we are asking whether it is
possible to widen the policy framework to add into the present regulatory
approaches a framework that we believe might add to our ability to control
this illicit traffic. SpecificaUy we suggest that at the same time we attempt
to close of supply at source, new kinds of policy initiatives be considered
which address the basic force that powers this trade,that is, the demand that
i exerted in the market environments.
An obvious solution, especially given the directions followed by
those trying to increase the protection of cultural heritage might be to
impose prohibitions in the demand environments comparable to those now
found at the supply end of the market chain. We do not sugge t such a step
for two reasons. One, from a crim.ill010gical perspective there is no reason
to believe that prohibition without strong public support (which it would
not have) would be any more successful in controlling the trade in
antiquities that it has been in the failed attempt to control the consumption
of alcohol or prohibited drug substances. Two, as stated above, there are a
number of ethical and civil rights issues that would arise with any attempt
to impose naked and strong penal auctions onto a trade such as antiquities.
The altemative proposals that we suggest are founded in calls for
models of regulation that incorporate a mix of (mostly) persuasion and
(scarce) puni bment. The' pyramid model (Braithwaite, 1993; Ayres and
Braithwaite, 1992) which heuristically captures this emphasis on persuasion
in the regulation of complex commercial behaviour has been applied
primarily to classic situations involving the control of corporations by
government regulatory bodies (for example, with reference to occupational
health and safety). The model has been extended to global business
regulation (Braithwaite 2000; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000), To capture

t~e co~plexity of regula,tion Grabosky (2000) suggests expanding the
dIm~nSI?nS of the pyralDld metaphor to include "third parties" such as
publIc mterest organizations and other commercial actors influencing
corporate bodies.
The central assumption of the approach being proposed is that
~ontrol ,of" the illici~ ~ntiquities market requires an expansion of
persuaSIve effo~s wI~hm. a more responsive and responsible regulatory
~amework. The ,m".eshgatIOn follows Braithwaite's (2000, 222) call for
new ways of thinking about crime and crime control,.," in the " ... new
regulatory stat,e" (B~aithwaite, 2000, 227-230). It is Braithwaite's argument
(see also BraIthWaite, 2002) that the traditional focus on crime control
based ?n legal prohibitions enforced by police, court and prison
mecha~sms a~e decreasingly relevant to today's needs. Much of that
anal'y~Is exalDl~es the transformation, for example, of policing from
tradltI~nal publIc law enforcement to new patterns of private policing and
emergmg patterns of regulation such as those concerned with "risk
ma~agement" of nuclear energy, transport companies, and space industries
(as m Vaughan, 1997).
It is the present argument that a central focus should be on demand
and should address those initiatives which would result in a market wher~
co~sumers tak.e an ethical position that there should be no purchase of
hentag~ matenal that lacks adequate provenience. The "persuasion" here
we beheve, should be aimed at increasing the awareness of consumers and
deal~rs of the imp?rtance of provenience, and the consequences of
contmued .cons~mptIOn of material which has been plundered from
archaeologICal SItes. Such an approach is both aimed at demand and would
be b~sed on persuasion rather than deterrence from coe;cive penal
sanctIOns.
. ""Ie have observed that the continued trade of plundered cultural
mate~"1aliS supported by the shared understanding among sellers and buyers
that Issue~ of provenance, or more exactly, provenience, will not be raised
",:he~ artIcles are purchased: thereby avoiding questions about illegal
dIg?mg and ex~ort practices. Consistently, for cultural heritage material
r~vlews of ~uctlOn house and private dealer catalogues demonstrate that
htt,le or n~ mformation is provided regarding the previous history of the
object (Chippendale and Gill, 2000; Mackenzie, 2005). Provenance in the
art world ~enerally re~ers to the ownership history of the object. For
cultur~l hentage matenal, archaeologists require more exact information
regardmg where the. mate~ial was found, when and by whom the dig was
conducted, a~y pubhshed mformation about the material, and its entry onto
the commerCIal market, and the term "provenience" has been suggested for

this more exacting form of provenance (for a discussion of the use of this
term, see Mackenzie, 2005, or Lapatin 2002). One of the featmes that
permits the trade to continue to flourish is the collective indifference of
purchasers, dealers and antiquities traders to this issue of provenience (for
an elaborated discussion of this problem see Mackenzie 2005). If dealers
would not sell, and customers not buy, cultural heritage material that lacked
provenience information, there would be no market for illicit antiquities.
Since the persuasion approach to address this problem has not been
tried in terms of its application to the antiquities traffic, at present the
model provides only a sense of direction. To be sure, applying what
Grabosky or Braithwaite are attempting in their regulatory regimes is
qualitatively different than the antiquities markets. The classic regulatory
situation is like that found regarding occupational health and safety. In that
context, there tend to be a clear set of potential victims (workers), a set of
possible offenders (companies), and a specific regulator that has
responsibility for addressing the problem (an occupational health and safety
unit). To apply a persuasion model to the antiquities trade requires more
than a little irmovation. The victims can be een either a the sites that are
being destroyed, or perhaps the nations that have responsibility for
protecting these sites (for an example of an argument that focuses on a
nation as a victim of cultural heritage crime, see discussion of Sassoon,
1999). The offenders are the various market players, including both dealers
and consumers. There is no exact fit in terms of a regulatory agency, but
that role might be played by individuals or units who have a stake in the
control of the problem.
One example of the "persuasion" approach might be, then, for
seminars to be held in major market centres that bring together
representatives from nations and locations where looting has been a
problem, a gathering of market participants such as dealers and potential
consumers, and the setting could be organized by groups such as
archaeologists, or representatives of etlmographic units or museums, or
cultural heritage agencies, who seek to limit the impact of the illicit traffic.
Such seminars could present vivid evidence of the cons quences of illegal
digging of objects, and also present clear understanding of the meaning
and application of issues of provenance and provenience (this is similar to
an idea suggested by a Nordic research team addressing cultural heritage
crime, as reported by Korsell, et aI, 2006, 175).
Another example of a non-punitive, collective agreement across
demand and supply nations is found in the ethical code of the International
Council of Museums (ICOM) which provides that museums will not buy
looted material. An illustration of the work of ICOM can be found in their

pu?lication Looting in Allgkor (ICOM, 1997 which lists '100 stolen
obJects. ~aken from Camb~dia (ICOM, 1997). The strategy is a practical
one ~en~illg from a ~rofes lanai association s ethical code that, through the
~ubbcatlOn of ~ p~bhc document, incorporates the general public and other
mterested parties III the. 'policing' of the purchase of illicit antiquities. It
serves both a preventative/control function (identifying works that have
been. stolen and therefore should not be purchased) and a restorative
functiOn (the return of the stolen goods to the source country). In our field
wo~k over. the ~ears, we have fo~nd a number examples of how this process
wOlks. to Id~ntlfy looted matenal and to result in the restoration of that
matenal to. Its country of origin (although it must be noted that often the
museums mvolved are less than forthcoming about their role in the
process). For our purposes however, its critical function is to provide a
clear set of und~rstan?illgs that underscore the principle that
unprovenanced matenal will not be acquired by museums either tbro h
pmchase of donation.
ug
. Since historically ~useum. have been one of the major purchasers
of unportant archaeologICal artIfacts, the publication itself and the
suc.ces.s~l return of stolen objects, could have considerable effects on the
antiqUltles trade ~ore gene~ally (e.g. dealers and individual buyer) in
term. of expectations regarding the provision of full provenance. Further
the lID~ortance of the development of such lists is indicated by the
productIon of an Emergency Red List of looted objects from Iraq (June
2003) as one of the first responses to the recent events which have resulted
from that war (for a discussion of looting in Iraq, see Polk and Schuster
2005' ~d for a documentation of the effects seen in the war in
Afgharustan, see van Krieken-Pieter 2006).
While these ideas might have appeal to many concerned today with
the problem of co?trolllng this illicit traffic there are other proposals which
are mor~ contentlOUS. One example of a negotiated/collaborative control
process.m a OUl"ce country that we have identified in our field work is the
excavation and docu.ill.entation of the Hoi An shipwreck in Vietnam, and
the ubse~uent archlvmg of some items and sale of others involved a
collaboratt~e agreement between the Vietnamese Government, marine
al'cbaeologlsts salvage operators and, ultimately antiquities dealers. It is
~ example of.a control strategy of negotiation and collaboration between
~nterested .partl~ with competing and diverse interests, but one which
LDvolv~s direc~ Illvolveroent of a sow'ce nation in defining the mechanisms
by w.hl~h ult1m~tely the material reache a legal market (for a brief
desen.ptlOn of ~s example, ee Krowitz 2003, 28). A somewhat irnilar
case IS found ill the arrangement between the British Government and
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salvage operators in the exploration of the Sussex wreck in Mediterranean
waters. In both of these cases, the source nation retains its control over the
material, its extraction, and its distribution, and the objects are not thereby
subject to looting by criminal networks. Further, and impo~a~t ~or presen~
interests if and when material comes onto the market (as It dId m the HOI
An exa~ple) it brings with it explicit reference to the provenience of the
material.
Immediately it needs to be acknowledged that there would be
strong objections to the Hoi An experience as a model. For one, the placing
of the material onto the market would be in violation of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage Convention which explicitly prohibits economic
exploitation of underwater cultural material. Archaeolo.gist would ar~e
that a major goal in addressing such sites is the preservation of the matenal
as much as possible in situ, thereby assuring the context for future reseClJ:~h.
Finally, most ource nations today have a complete ban on any mater~al
leaving the country, especially if it i destined for the commerCIal
. .
antiquities market.
One of the main reasons we present the HOI An program IS that, for
all of its faults it demonstrates that it is possible for source nations and the
market to neg~tiate issues relating to the study of cultural heritag~ sit~s, and
access to material that is produced. Because of the collaboratIOn, It was
possible to investigate a site where otherwise the source nation likely would
not have the economic resources to carry out the work. There may be ways
other than sale to move the material onto a wider cultural stage, these might
procedures whereby the ownership remains vested in the source na~i~n,
including loans of material, leasing arrangements, or perhaps Jomt
ownership.
"
.
The position of many in the cultural hentage comm~mty IS that
commercial exploitation of cultural heritage should not be perrmtted. In one
form (a presented above by Kersel and Luke, 2003), archaeolo~is~s argue
that cultural heritage sites should be preserved for study by speCIalIsts who
have an understanding and appreciation of the critical importance of
context.
That is a view that merits public attention and debate. While we are
willing to defer on many of these issues to the expert~se of our
archaeological and cultural heritage colleagues we would pomt out two
major problems in this argument. One, it is impossible to eliminate. the
market for antiquities. Given that the market exists, present understandmgs
within that market (and continuing demand) assure that unprovenanced
cultural heritage material leaks into that market. Ways need to be found,
we would argue, to increase the willingness of those inside that market to
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avoid dealing 0-~ .or purchasing, unprovenanced material. Two, reliance
totally on prohibItlon, when moral support for demand remains strong has
a m~mber of p~tentially disastrous effects. Not only will the m~rket
contmue to flounsh (and the destruction of archaeological sites continue)
but such attempts generate a high level of contempt for the rule of I '
Wh d
d
. hi
aw.
en eman remams gh, and the economic rewards are considerable
that. contempt
fosters
the wid.er problem of organized
..
.
- cnm'e . In th e case 0 .f'
antiqUlbeS~ the dlsastr?us effects of whatever organized crime will result
not o~y m. the contmued destruction of heritage sites, but forms of
orgaruz~d cn~e that are at considerable distance from the niceties of the
economIC, SOCIal and political life found in demand environments.
It also ne~ds to be said that we have only begun a discussion on the
f~nns of persuaSIOn t~at. ~ght be tried. While we have pointed out the
dIs~al rec~rd of prohibItlon and detlmence as major or sole planks of
pub!JC polley, there are examples where mixes of persuasion and
purushment ap~ear to have endUring effects. Over many years in countries
such as ~he Um~ed States ~d Australia, there bas been a concerned attempt
by ~tl-Smoking ~ampalgns to alter attitudes and behavior tOward
~~~ki.l1g. Mo.st of tlus effort has been through public health and educational
InItlatIves, WIth some support in tenns of laws banmn'g s k i '
.
.
.
mo ng ill vanous
publIc. places, and the rmx seems to have met with success. A similar
campaIgn has b~en launched regarding the use of seat-belts, although in
that .case. there IS. p~obably a heavier role played by the punishments
prOVIde? ill the cn?Unal laws. Both suggest the possibility that mixes of
persuaSIOn and purushment can serve as a guide for public policy.
-!"I.0~e .work can be done where there are indications of potentially
hel~fu1 1l1~tlatJves..The heavy-handed retentionist policies of many source
nations rmght ~e~elve greater support in the market environments if there
~~re more pO~It1ve efforts to share material through such mechanisms as
Jomt owners~p (as for example in art material between France and
England), leasmg arrangements, or long-tean loans (especially to specific
and dedIcate.d .~useum colle~tions that can serve as centers for learning as
wel~ as exhibItIon). ~here IS scope for much wider use of the sale of
replIcas (developed m collaboration with source nations), especially
thr~ugh the mu~eum shops that have become such an important marketing
deVICe for fundmg of the larger museums. Efforts might be undertaken to
broaden and deepen initiatives such as can be seen in the gr
S
An' .. fi
oup ave
ttqUlties or Everyone, (SAFE). In a discussion of SAFE, Lazrus (2008,
272) comments that an Important question that needs to be addressed is'
Why should and how can people ensure the safety of works they wili
never ee?'
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There is a flaw in our proposals that requires mention. The
approach suggested here caJIs for major effort in the demand environments
focusing on dealers and potential customers in such venues as New York,
London, Paris, Amsterdam Brussels and similar locations. Such efforts by
definition will have no purchase on the large domestic markets in Asia
especially in China. There is no question that for hundreds of years a
primary source of market pressure producing the plunder in Asia has come
from demand exerted by these domestic markets. Parallel thought, and
work, will have to be undertaken in these if there is to be any significant
reduction in the size of the illicit antiquities problem, especially in Asia.

Conclusion

Currently there is a peculiar kind of standoff that is found
concerning the traffic in illicit antiquities. On one side are the cultural
heritage supporters and archaeologists who base their strategy for the
control of illicit traffic in antiquities on prohibition at source. On the other
side is the market which because of demand, and because sale at destination
is legal, continues to flourish (which is possible in part because due
diligence regarding provenance is, by mutual consent, ignored). The
consequence of the standoff between these positions is that cultural heritage
sites around the globe continue to be turned into moonscapes. However
necessary and important prohibition regulations may be, these are not by
themselves protecting cultural heritage. There is no surprise in this for the
criminologist, since this form of illicit traffic can be added to a long list of
problems which are not solved simply by prohibition. We would urge that
the debate be widened, and that the question of "who owns the past"
(Gibbon, 2005; Cuno, 2008) be taken as an issue for negotiation, and as
that problem is considered, steps are taken to reduce demand in the market
nations.
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